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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DE WEN LUI, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A098-715-331) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam Mills 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 26, 2012 
 
Before:  FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 







 Lui, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a decision by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) which dismissed his appeal of an immigration judge’s 
 
2 
(“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture.1
I. 
 
 Lui was served with a Notice to Appear in December 2004, two days after his 
arrival in the United States.  He was charged with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled.  Lui conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and 
CAT protection with the immigration court. 
 Lui claimed that because his wife was under 24 years old at the time they were 
married, they were unable to obtain a permit to have a child.  However, his wife became 
pregnant shortly after their request for a permit was denied and, two days after he learned 
of the pregnancy, a family planning official ordered his wife to report for a physical 
examination.  In fear of the pregnancy’s discovery, he and his wife went into hiding.  Lui 
claimed that family planning officials thereafter came to his house, harassed his family 
members, and destroyed his belongings, and, as a result of his wife’s pregnancy, Lui was 
fined and his father was arrested.  His wife eventually turned herself in and was forced to 
have an abortion.  Lui claimed that he still owes much of the fine levied against him, and 
                                              
1 The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision of the Immigration 
Judge denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection to the petitioner as 
he had not carried his burden of establishing eligibility for any relief. 
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would be beaten, jailed, and tortured upon his return to China as a result.  Moreover, he 
contends that he and his wife may face sterilization by the Chinese government. 
 After a hearing, the IJ determined that Lui was not credible and failed to 
sufficiently corroborate his claims.  The IJ therefore denied his applications for relief and 
ordered him removed to China.  On appeal, the BIA determined that the IJ’s adverse 
credibility finding was not clearly erroneous and agreed that Lui had provided 
insufficient corroboration for his claim.  The BIA therefore dismissed his appeal, and Lui 
timely petitioned this Court for review. 
II. 
  We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review 
factual findings, including any credibility determinations, under a substantial evidence 
standard.  See Cao v. Att’y Gen., 407 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under that standard, 
we must uphold the BIA’s decision unless the evidence not only supports a contrary 
conclusion, but compels it.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 
2001).  The burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
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relief under the CAT is on the applicant.  Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)).2
III. 
 
 Lui presently argues that the IJ erred in finding his testimony improbable and 
incredible.  Among other things, the IJ found that Lui’s contention that his then-twenty-
three-year-old wife was underage for a birth permit was inconsistent with the family 
planning regulations he submitted as evidence.  Although Lui argues that the birth of his 
child did not qualify as a “late childbearing” under those regulations, see A.R. 424, the 
only regulations relevant to late childbearing provide that “citizens who practice late 
marriage and late childbirth shall be awarded with extended leaves for marriage and 
childbirth or other benefits.”  A.R. 418.  Indeed, nothing in the record – save Lui’s 
testimony – indicates that only “late childbearing” is permissible or that he and his wife 
were otherwise ineligible to have a child.  Although the regulations do forbid “early 
childbirth,” the definition of that term makes no mention of a woman's age, and the 
provision does not apply to the circumstances Lui described because he and his wife were 
married and having their first child.  A.R. 426. 
                                              
2 Because Lui filed his asylum application after the enactment of the REAL ID 
Act, the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods upon which the adverse credibility 
finding is based need not go to the heart of his claim. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 
114, 119 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).  Rather, the REAL ID Act permits credibility determinations 
to be based on observations of Lui’s demeanor, the plausibility of his story, and the 
consistency of his statements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Gabuniya v. Att’y Gen., 
463 F.3d 316, 322 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 In fact, the regulations Lui submitted as evidence are inconsistent with the 
requirements he claims led to a forced abortion.  They provide generally that “[a]fter 
approval is granted for a couple to have an additional child, the birth must occur at least 
four years after the previous child’s birth, and the wife must be at least 25 years of age.”  
A.R. 426.  The regulations therefore appear to contemplate that children will be born to 
women younger than twenty-four:  if, as Lui contends, a woman must be twenty-four 
years old to obtain permission to have her first child, a woman younger than twenty-eight 
years old could not, as a matter of course, have a second child four years after her first 
and comply with the rule.  Lui offers no explanation of this inconsistency. 
 Accordingly, we are not compelled to disagree with the determination that Lui’s 
testimony regarding his wife’s allegedly forced abortion was not credible.  The record 
likewise supports the determination that Lui failed to demonstrate that he will be 
mistreated upon return to China.  We therefore find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that 
he is not entitled to relief.3
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                              
3 Because Lui is not entitled to relief, we need not address Lui’s challenges to 
other aspects of the BIA’s adverse credibility or corroboration analysis.  Any errors in 
those aspects of the BIA’s decision would have been harmless and would not justify 
granting the petition for review.  See Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e will view an error as harmless and not necessitating a remand to the 
BIA when it is highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.”). 
